



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

# The Classical Weekly

Entered as second-class matter November 18, 1907, at the Post Office, New York, N. Y., under the Act of Congress of March 3, 1879  
Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on June 28, 1918

VOL. XIII

NEW YORK, OCTOBER 27, 1919

No. 4

## ANALYSIS OF LUCRETII, DE RERUM NATURA I-III

(Concluded from pages 5, 13, 21)

19. Summing up of 730-990 (991-1022). We mortals, then, are, <in the sense in which I use the words, not in the sense in which some call earth (Cybele) the Mother>, of seed divine, with heaven as our father, earth as our mother (991-998). 'Death' is not destruction, but rather return of our elements to heaven or to earth (999-1003); it is a re-formation, rather, through the joining of the atoms that once made us to other atoms, to form new combinations, new sentient beings (1004-1006). Once again we see that the matter of prime importance is the way the atoms are combined, how they move (1007-1009, 1013-1022); they are not *per se* possessed of certain qualities (1010-1012).
20. There are other worlds than ours (1023-1089).
- (a) Introduction (1023-1047).
- (1) I am going now to present a truth marvelously new to you (1023-1025).
- (2) It will be hard, at first, for you to grasp it, but, even as other hard things become easier and easier to understand, and hence less marvelous (witness e. g. the phenomena of the skies), even so will this (1026-1029).
- (3) Therefore let the novelty of what I shall say be but an incentive to you to use your reason, to test the truth or the falsity of my words as I seek to learn what lies beyond this world of ours (1040-1047).
- (b) Statement of the new point, preceded and followed by proof (1048-1076). Since matter and space are infinite, and since uncountable atoms are ceaselessly in motion in unlimited space, moving of their own accord, at random, colliding ceaselessly, it is inconceivable that the atoms united only once to form an *orbis terrarum caelumque*.

The form here is rather novel, since eight lines of argument precede the statement of the matter to be proved (1055-1056). Again, as Mr. Lee notes, 1067-1076 repeat, almost verbatim, 1048-1066. His sane note is worth quoting in full: "1067-1076 is a mere repetition of the previous argument. In view of this and other instances of careless writing and lack of revision of the poem, it is surely obvious that we should not seek for strict logical accuracy in Lucretius and alter the order of lines in order to obtain it, if we wish to have the poem as written by the poet". Yet, in his text, Mr. Lee marks 1067-1076 as a second proof! So

too does Mr. Bailey. We may, however, say that Lucretius himself tripped up these editors, by *principio* in 1048, and *praeterea* in 1067; he was unaware how completely he was repeating himself.

- (c) Second proof: Nothing in nature is unique (1077-1089).
- (1) Preliminary statement (1077-1081).
- (2) Illustrations, from wild beasts, human beings, fishes, birds (1081-1083).
- (3) Summary (1084-1089). There are countless earths, suns, moons (1084-1086): these things are born as surely as are the populous genera of earth (1087-1089).
21. Digression, giving an ethical consequence of the truth just proved, in 20 (1090-1104).
- (a) Preliminary statement: The fact that there are many worlds at once frees us of fear of the gods; we see that nature herself, *dis expers*, does all things (1090-1092).
- (b) Proofs (1093-1104):
- (1) The gods could not rule so many worlds without sad interruption of the life of peace and calm which should be theirs (1093-1101).
- (2) The world is too topsy-turvy to be in the control of gods (1101-1104).
22. Return to main discussion (1105-1174).
- (a) The universe grew slowly, is coming slowly to perfection, through additions from without (1105-1117); <it will continue to grow in this way> till what is added to it shall be less than what flows away from it (1118-1121).
- (b) This is the law of life for all bodies: so long as they take in more than they give out, they grow and live (1122-1130); when they give out more than they take in, they diminish and die (1131-1143).
- (c) The universe, too, will thus yield to decay; indeed, it is already showing signs of decay (1144-1174).
- (1) Preliminary statement (1144-1150).
- (2) Proofs (1150-1172):
- (1') To-day the earth produces only tiny creatures; she no longer produces wild creatures with giant bodies (1150-1159).
- (2') What the earth once bore spontaneously, she now bears only reluctantly, even after man has toilfully tilled the ground (1160-1172).
- (3) Summary: All things gradually decay and pass away (1173-1174).

## Book III

## 23. Introduction to Book III: Praise of Epicurus (1-30).

## B. We must now understand the soul (31-1094).

1. Statement of the second great theme of Books I-III (31-93). I must now explain the nature of the soul, and, by so doing, drive away from men utterly that fear of death and Acheron which at present so clouds the life of men (31-47), and leads men to outrage every virtue (48-86). Such fear only reason <as informed by the teachings of Epicurus> can dispel (87-93).

2. The soul of man is corporeal, matter (94-416)<sup>28</sup>.

- (a) The soul is a distinct part of a man, as truly as are his hands, his feet, his eyes (94-135).

This idea is presented in two parts:

Part One, Affirmative (94-97).

Part Two, Negative: The soul is not, as some assert, a 'harmony' of the parts of the body (98-135).

The idea in the affirmative part of this presentation is that the soul is not an entity separate and distinct from the body. Such an entity might live apart from the body, before the birth of the body, or after the death of the body, or both before the birth of the body and after its death. In the last case, at least, the soul would be immortal. Lucretius's opposition to such a view is intelligible. On the other hand, the view that made the soul a 'harmony' of the parts of the body involved, plainly, the mortality of the soul, so that one shares Mr. Duff's surprise that Lucretius assails this view so warmly.

- (1) The doctrine of 'harmony' defined. The soul, some say, is not a part of the body (98), but rather the result of a livegiving posture or arrangement of the parts of the body, to which we owe consciousness (100-104).

- (2) Declaration that this view is false (105).

- (3) Proofs of its falsity (106-123):

- (1') In our waking hours soul and body are independent of each other in pleasure and pain (106-111).

- (2') While we sleep, though the body is without consciousness, the soul is at times extraordinarily active (112-116).

- (3') At times, though large parts of their bodies have been removed, men live on (117-120); at other times, the departure from the body of only a few particles of heat or air works death (121-123).

- (4) Summary (124-135). The parts of the body, then, are not of equal importance to life <a view which the doctrine of 'harmony' postulates> (124-125); heat and air are rather the factors of prime importance to <the existence and> the maintenance of life in the

body (126-129). The soul is thus a part of man, not a 'harmony' (131-135).

- (b) *Animus* and *anima* make one entity (136-160).

- (1) Preliminary statement (136-144). The *animus* part of the soul and the *anima* part are held together in closest union, as one entity (136-137); the dominant part is the *animus*, reason (138-139). The *animus* is situate in mid-breast, for there we feel the throb of fear, the thrill of joy (140-142). The *anima* is scattered through all the rest of the body (143); it is subject to the beck and the call of the *animus* <i. e. is connected directly with the *animus*, and subject to it> (144).

- (2) Proof (145-158). Though at times the *animus* has intelligence, emotion by itself (145), unshared by the *anima* or by the body (146-151), still, if the emotion that moves the *animus* is especially powerful, the *anima* too everywhere suffers (152-158).

- (3) Summary (158-160).

- (c) The *animus* and the *anima* are both corporeal (161-176).

- (1) Preliminary statement (161-162).

- (2) Proofs (163-174):

- (1') Their effects on the body are explainable only on the theory that they touch the body (163-167).

- (2') They are affected by bodily conditions, i. e. are touched by the body (168-173).

- (3) Summary (175-176).

- (d) The *animus* is composed of very small, fine, smooth atoms (177-230).

- (1) Preliminary statement (177-180).

- (2) Proofs (181-227):

- (1') The *animus* is extraordinarily mobile, swift (181-185), because its atoms are marvelously round (186), marvelously small (187), and hence movable by the slightest force (188-207).

- (2') When, at death, the <*animus* and the> *anima* depart, there is no evidence, either to the eye or to the scales, that anything has gone from the body: everything that was there, while the man lived, is still there save the feeling that goes with life (i. e. consciousness) and heat: the *anima*, too, is composed of atoms markedly round and small (208-227).

- (3) Summary (228-230).

- (e) Fourfold composition of the soul (231-322).

- (1) Statement I (231-245). The soul is not homogeneous (231); it consists rather of four elements—(1) air in its thinner, more rarified forms (232), (2) heat (233), (3) air in its denser forms (234-237), and, since none of these three elements is capable in itself of sensation (238-240), (4) a certain fourth nature, nameless (241-242), but <describable

<sup>28</sup>Lucretius takes for granted here, what he proves later, that in the soul *animus* and *anima* are united. He also has in mind, here and later, the caution to which he finally gives expression in 421-424, that what is said of the *animus* applies to the *anima*, and vice versa. In this Analysis, then, 'soul' is used to cover either *animus* or *anima* separately, or their combination.

as> the swiftest and subtlest of things (243-244), with atoms as small and as smooth as can be (244), and as the source of sensation throughout the body (245).

All this leads to

- (2) Statement II: Explanation of sensation (246-257): This 'certain fourth nature' is first stirred by sensation (emotion), since its atoms are so small (246); next the heat of the soul is stirred, then the air of the soul in its thinner forms, and lastly the air in its denser forms (247-248); finally the whole body is stirred to feeling, of pleasure or of pain, through the blood (248-249), the flesh (249), and, lastly, the bones and the marrow (250-251), though, it must be noted, few emotions get thus far, for progress thus far means death, and the escape of the soul through all the pores of the body (252-257).
- (3) Statement III (258-272): The atoms of these four elements<sup>34</sup> are in constant collision one with another, are coursing in and out of one another, so to say (258-263); no one of them can be separated from the rest (263-264), no one of them can exercise its functions at a distance from the rest (264-272).
- (4) Statement IV (273-281): The fourth nameless element is the 'deepest, innermost thing in our bodies' (273-274: see Duff on 276-281), and is 'the very soul of the soul' <i. e. it bears the same relation to the soul as the soul bears to the body> (275); as in our bodies *animus* and *anima* are bound into one entity, 'deep hidden', unseen (276-277), because made of atoms few and small (278), so the fourth nameless element, because made of tiny atoms, is 'deep hidden' in the soul, is its very soul (280), and thus master of the soul and the body both (280-281).
- (5) Statement V (282-283): The other three elements of the soul have power only because they are commingled.
- (6) Statement VI (283-287): Though these three elements are commingled, still now one, now another of them stands out beyond the other two (284), in such a way, however, that after all but one thing is produced by the combination of the three (285), for, if any one of them could really be severed from the other two, sensation would be destroyed (286-287).
- (7) Illustrations of Statement VI (288-322):
  - Group 1: General (abstract) (288-293):
    - (1') The predominance of heat leads to anger (288-289);
    - (2') Abundance of air, in its thinner, colder forms brings fear in its train (290-291):

(3') The predominance of air in its denser forms leads to a quieter, more static condition (292-293).

Group 2: Specific (concrete), from animals (294-322):

- (4') If heat dominates in the souls of animals, the animals have fiery, wrathful souls (294-298);
- (5') When air in its thinner, colder forms dominates, we have such timorous animals as the deer (299-301);
- (6') When air in its denser forms dominates, we have placid creatures like cows and oxen (302-306);
- (7') So, in spite of the sameness which <like> training tends to produce in men, men differ, as testy, or fearful, or placid, etc. (307-318); though reason can keep wrong tendencies so well in check that we can, if we will, lead the life of gods (319-322).

(f) Soul and body are most intimately connected (323-395).

(1) Statement I (323-336): The soul thus constituted is maintained by the whole body, and itself guards the body and is the cause of its health; to tear soul from body involves the annihilation of each of them (323-330); so wholly one is the life with which they are endowed, so indestructible is their partnership (331-332), that neither can by itself have sensation: sensation is due wholly to their interaction (333-336).

(2) Statement II (337-349): Without soul the body can not be born, or grow, or exist after death (337-343). <The soul, again, cannot, apart from the body, exist<sup>35</sup>>: that there may be life, body and soul must exist together; severance of body from soul means the death of each (344-349).

(3) Three examples of *occupatio*: refutation of the theory that it is the soul only that has sensation (350-369).

(1') Example 1 (350-355):

(a) Objection: Some hold that only the soul has sensation, that the body proper does not feel (350-352).

(β) Answer: This is an absurd view (353), contradicted by manifest facts; my theory alone explains sensation (354-355).

(2') Example 2 (356-357):

(a) Objection: At the departure of the soul the body is, everywhere, without sensation (356).

(β) Answer: Naturally, since then it loses what never belonged to it itself <but existed only because body was combined—for the time—with soul> (357-358).

<sup>34</sup>I supply *eorum* with *primordia* (262) and take *primordia* not in the ordinary sense, but rather of the four elements of the soul. *Principiorum* is a virtual *suis* or *propriis* with *motibus* (263).

<sup>35</sup>Lucretius does not say this in terms; but this doctrine is, of course, necessary to his general argument here.

- (3') Example 3 (359-369):
- (a) Objection: The soul alone has sensation: the body *per se* has none. For example, the eyes *per se* see nothing, they are merely the opened doors through which the soul sees (359-360).
- (β) Answer (361-369):
- (α') The attempted analogy is false. No matter how widely you open a door, the door feels no pain; if you open the eyes in the presence of a great light, the eyes feel pain, and we do not see the light. Hence the eyes have a function in sight (361-366).
- (β') <The more completely a door is opened the better: hence>, if the theory I am combating is right, the best way to see would be to remove the eyes, sockets and all (367-369).
- (4) Refutation of Democritus's view (370-395).
- (1') Statement of Democritus's view: atoms of soul and atoms of body alternate in the make-up of the body (370-373).
- (2') Disproof of this view (374-395): The atoms of the soul are much smaller than the atoms of the body (374-375), and fewer (376), and so are set at intervals one from the other (376-377). Certain very small objects alight upon the body without being perceived by the body: this proves that the spaces between the atoms of the soul are larger than those small objects (378-395).
- (g) The *animus* part of the soul is more essential to life than is the *anima* part (396-416).
- (1) Preliminary statement (396-397).
- (2) Proofs (398-415):
- (1') Without the *animus* the *anima* cannot exist at all: it perishes, utterly, at once (398-401).
- (2') But without the *anima* man can and does live on (402); though you mangle his *anima* as you will, all but taking it away utterly, he yet lives (403-407). It is with *animus* and *anima* as it is with the pupil of the eye and the whole ball of the eye (*orbis luminis*): the destruction of the pupil works instantly complete loss of sight, whereas, if you leave the pupil intact, you may destroy all the rest without impairment of the sight (408-415).
- (3) Summary (416).
3. The soul is mortal (417-829).
- (a) Preliminary statement: The soul is born, and the soul dies: the soul is mortal (417-420).
- (b) Caution: Bear in mind that, since *animus* and *anima*, combined, make one entity, whatever in the coming discussion shall be said of either *animus* or *anima* will apply equally to the other as well: whatever shall prove one mortal will prove the other, too, mortal (421-424).
- (c) Proofs (425-829):
- (1) The fineness of its atoms proves the soul mortal (425-444). Since the soul is made of atoms extremely small and mobile (425-433), it follows that, when once it is set free from the body, its atoms must scatter even more readily and swiftly than the atoms of water scatter when the vessel holding the water is broken (434-439). If the body, which is to the soul what the vessel is to the water, cannot, when it has been shattered by some violence or its parts have been more widely separated by the withdrawal of the blood, hold the soul, much less can the air, a thing so much rarer than our bodies, keep the atoms of the soul from scattering (440-444).
- (2) Since, as we clearly see, the soul is born with the body, grows with the body, and ages with the body, in all these operations being wholly one with the body (445-454), it follows that the only other experience the body can have—death—the soul too must undergo (455-458).
- (3) The soul has diseases and kindred unhappy experiences, even as the body has; it can be cured by medicine, even as the body is (459-525).
- (1') The soul suffers from anxieties, grief and fear (459-462).
- (2') The diseases of the body profoundly affect the soul (*animus*) (463-473)<sup>35</sup>.
- (3') The phenomena of intoxication (476-481) are explainable only on the theory that intoxication affects the soul as well as the body (482-486).
- (4') Epilepsy, too, affects the soul (486-509)
- (a) Epilepsy affects the soul as well as the body (487-494). Because it affects the body, the sufferer groans (495-498); because it affects the soul, he loses his wit (499-505). If, while it is in the body, the soul suffers so <i. e. comes so near to death>, surely, when it is no longer protected by the body, its atoms will not be able to cling together: the soul will die (506-509).
- (5') The soul can be cured by medicine. To (change =) cure the soul (or anything else) involves addition of parts or transposition of parts or subtraction of parts (510-516): to such operations the thing that is immortal will not submit (517-520).
- (6') Summary (521-525).
- (4) (1') Men often die limb by limb (526-530). Since this piecemeal cutting off of the life from the limbs involves loss of the parts of the soul that were in this or that limb (i. e. severance of the soul), the soul too must be mortal (531-532).

<sup>35</sup>474-475 are an interpolation.

- (2') Refutation of an objection (533-547).
- (a) Objection: The soul in such cases does not die: it withdraws, intact, from the wounded parts, into the inner parts of the body, massing there its parts (533-535).
- (β) Answer: (1) If there were a place into which the soul could thus withdraw, that place would plainly be possessed of keener sensation: but no such place is ever found (536-539). (2) But, even if we were to grant that the soul would, under the circumstances imagined, withdraw intact and mass its parts in some one inner place, it would still remain mortal (540-543), for the soul plainly has less and less of sensation, grows feebler and feebler as the body loses part after part (544-547).
- (5) The soul (*mens*) is a part of the body, resident in a fixed place, and so stands to the body as do ears and eyes and other organs of sense (548-550); since eyes, etc., cannot feel or live apart from the body, the soul cannot exist apart from the body (551-557).
- (6) Soul and body owe their existence to their union and to that alone: neither can exist by itself alone, any more than the eye, if torn out from the body by the roots, can see (558-565). Consciousness is made possible by the fact that, while the soul is in the body, its atoms are held together by the body (566-570); the moment the protection of the body is withdrawn, the atoms of the soul scatter in air and consciousness ceases (570-579).
- (7) The rotting of the body after death proves the mortality of the soul, for that rotting takes place because the soul goes out gradually from the body; in this way more and more the very foundations of the body are destroyed (580-588); in a word, the soul was torn asunder and scattered *in* the body, before it went forth from the body into the air (589-591).
- (8) Some shocks, which do not cause actual death, profoundly affect the soul, so that it would fain go forth from the body <i. e. so that it, too, nearly dies> (592-601). All this points clearly to the conclusion that a heavier shock would cause death completely (602), and makes it certain that the soul—a frail thing—, if robbed of the shelter of the body and let out into the open air, could not hold together even for a moment (603-606).
- (9) No dying man ever feels his soul dying *in toto*, at once; he feels it failing at some specific [point (607-611)<sup>37</sup>.] The very plaints of the dying testify to the mortality of the soul, for the dying complain that they are losing consciousness (sensation) here and there, i. e. that the soul is dying here and there in their bodies: they do not complain that the soul <intact, as a whole> is quitting them, as they would complain if the soul were immortal <and so capable of leaving the body, at the death of the body, itself alive, and of living on apart from the body> (612-614).
- (10) The fact that the soul (*mens consiliumque*) has its fixed place proves that it is mortal (614-616); such fixity of position and fixity of arrangement of parts mark perishable things (617-623).
- (11) To make the soul immortal we must postulate a soul with five senses (624-630). This involves the impossible supposition that the means by which the senses function—eyes, nose, hand, tongue, ears—can exist independently, apart from the body (631-633).
- (12) What happens when the body is severed proves that the soul is mortal (634-669).
- (1') If the body is cut in two, the soul is likewise cleft in twain, and scattered with the body (634-639). What is parted, itself disclaims its immortality (640-641).
- (2') Examples of severance of soul along with severance of body (642-663):
- (a) Often when limbs of warriors are hewn off in battle, the severed parts, as well as the main bodies of the warriors, show divers signs of consciousness (642-656).
- (β) If you cut a serpent into piece after piece, with each new blow the parts previously cut off quiver afresh (657-663).
- (3') Summary (664-669):
- To say that there was a separate, whole soul in each of the severed parts leads to the absurd conclusion that one living creature had many souls (664-666); to say that there was but one soul, which the cutting divided, is to prove the soul mortal, since what is severable is mortal (667-669).
- (13) The fact that the soul has no recollection of its existence prior to its life in a given body proves the soul mortal (670-673). If it did in fact exist before its entrance into a body but cannot now recall that existence, it must now be near its death <having lost so much of its vitality> and so be mortal (674-676): it is easier to assume that the earlier soul is wholly dead and that the present soul was created for its present body (677-678).
- (14) The fact that the soul is completely blended with the body proves that it is mortal—that it is born with the body, grows with it, dies with it (679-712).
- (1') If the soul did not enter the body till the body is fully formed, and if the soul itself, on entering such a body, were itself fully developed (679-681), the soul could never

<sup>37</sup>This argument resembles that in (7). Hence Mr. Bailey would set 607-614 between 591 and 592. But see Notes 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 27.

unite with the body (682-683), but it would live by itself in a sort of den in the body (684), instead of being, as we clearly see, bound up with the body in the closest of unions (685-694).

(2') A corollary of (1') is that, since the soul is so completely blended with the body, it cannot, when the body dies, extricate itself, intact and whole, from sinews, bones, joints <and so be capable of living on> (695-697).

(3') If the soul, when it entered such a body as I imagined above (under (1')), <instead of abiding by itself in a sort of den, as I imagined there, 679-684>, is distributed through the members of the body, its mortality is even clearer (698-700), for a soul that thus permeated a body would lose its identity, its life, as surely as food that enters the body and is diffused through the body loses its life (701-712).

(15) A dilemma (713-740):

(1') If the soul, when it goes forth from the body, leaves parts of itself behind, the soul is mortal (713-716).

In such a case the soul would be severable, dissoluble: such things perish.

(2') If the soul is still intact when it goes forth, how do you account for the development of life—so much life—e. g. so many worms—in the dead body? (717-721).

(a) One theoretically possible answer, that the souls of these worms were set, separately, each by itself, into their bodies from without (722-723), will cause you to be beset with fresh questions, wholly unanswerable (724-729):

(a') Why do so many new souls gather where but one soul existed before? (724-725).

(β') Do these separate souls (1) go hunting for the seeds of the worms and themselves build for themselves a habitation (727-728), or (2) are they, so to say, inserted into bodies already fully developed (729)?

(β) Comments on (a), (β') (730-740):

(a') Statement I: The souls do not go hunting for the seeds of worms, etc.: (730-731).

(β') Proof (731-737):

(a'') It would not be worth their while: to hunt up bodies for themselves would mean exchange of freedom from troubles (e. g. cold and hunger) for such troubles (731-734).

(β'') If it were worth their while, they could not find for themselves habitations: they cannot fashion for themselves bodies (735-737).

(γ') Statement II: The souls can not be inserted into bodies already full grown, for in that event they could never achieve that close union with the body on which life and sensation depend, and in the absence of such union they could never have sensation at all (738-740).

(16) The inheritance of characteristics, physical and spiritual, is proof of the mortality of the soul (741-805).

(1') Since the physical characteristics are born with the body, grow with it <and die with it>, we must conclude that the spiritual characteristics are born, grow, and die side by side with the body (741-747).

(2') We cannot account for the persistence of spiritual characteristics by supposing that immortal souls, with fixed and persistent spiritual characteristics, enter bodies (748-805).

(a) If such souls entered now one body, now another, we should have such hybrids as a dog of Hyrcanian body showing the timidity of a stag, or a bird with the body of a hawk showing the spirit of a dove; we should have witless men, wise wild beasts (748-753).

(β) The assertion, made by some, that the immortal soul, on entrance into different bodies, changes <to adapt its nature to those of the different bodies>, is self-contradictory, for such change of the soul would mean its death (754-759).

(γ) The assertion that an immortal soul of a given type—e. g. a human soul—always enters a body of a given type—e. g. a human body—is disproved by the fact that in the first period of its union with the body it shows a complete lack of the wisdom it had—as an immortal soul—prior to its entrance into the body (760-764).

(δ) If, to meet the difficulty raised by (γ), it is urged that the immortal soul, on entering the new, feeble body, becomes itself feeble <but later grows stronger as the body grows stronger> (765-766), then we may reply

(a') the postulated change of the soul itself proves the mortality of the soul (766-768);

(β') the postulated growth of the soul itself proves the mortality of the soul: the soul can not grow with the body unless it begins its existence with the body, i. e. is born when the body is born <and so must die when the body dies> (769-771).

(ε) If the soul is immortal, why does it wish to leave an aged body? Is it afraid that

the body—its house—will collapse upon it? But for an immortal thing there are no perils (772-775).

The thought seems to be that an immortal soul—once it entered a body—would be willing to live on forever in the body regardless of the body's condition: an immortal soul could not be affected, in any way, by the body.

(j) To suppose that immortal souls are waiting, fighting one with another, to enter bodies of beasts or men is wildly absurd (776-780); even wilder is it to suppose that souls have a bargain to the effect that in the matter of souls entering bodies it shall be a case of first come first served (781-783).

(n) The soul has a fixed place—in the body—in which alone it can exist: in this respect it is exactly like e. g. trees, clouds, fish, etc., i. e. it is as dependent as they on a specific environment, and so is as mortal as they (784-789). More than that, the soul (*animus*) has in the body itself its fixed, invariable place: it is therefore still more inconceivable that the *animus* could live wholly outside of the body (790-799). The supposition that an immortal soul is joined <in this intimate way> to a mortal body is foolishness: things so different as immortal and mortal could not agree and cooperate harmoniously (800-805).

(17) There are certain conditions precedent to immortality: the soul fulfils none of these (806-818).

(18) To say that the soul is immortal, on the ground that it is protected from death-bringing forces, is to fly in the face of plain facts (819-823). For it grows sick in unison with sicknesses of the body (824); it worries about the future (825-826); is a prey to fear (826); it suffers remorse for past sins (827); it is subject to frenzy (828), to forgetfulness (828), and lethargy profound (829).

4. Summary of 3.30-829: Death has therefore no meaning for us: we have no jot or tittle of cause to fear it (830-869).

The third book might well stop here, since with verse 869 Lucretius's own positive teaching *de morte* is complete. But we have more, in the form of

5. Refutations of popular misconceptions in connection with death (870-1023).

(a) Men often moan over what will happen to their *bodies* when they are dead! Wrongly, because they do not really grasp the significance of the doctrine of the mortality of the *body*, even though they profess to believe that doctrine. There will be no feeling in the *body* post mortem (870-911).

(b) Men sorrow and moan because life's joys are so soon to be ended by death (912-915).

Answers (916-977):

(1) Lucretius's answer (916-930): Men err in lamenting thus, because they do not really grasp the significance of the mortality of the *soul*: there will be no feeling in the *soul* post mortem (911-930).

(2) Nature's answer: "Wherein is the speedy coming of death terrible? Let me prolong your life as I will: I can give you nothing new. The trouble lies with *you*, not with the length nor with the shortness of life: you are never content with what you have, and so make no progress in preparation for death" (931-962).

(3) Lucretius's comment: Nature is right: one thing must perish that another may be born. Everything must die, but, be it noted, *nothing goes down to Tartarus*. Indeed, Acheron, Tantalus, Tityos, Sisyphus, Cerberus, Tartarus, etc., of story have no *objective* existence: they exist rather in this world, in the experiences of men that do wrong (963-1023).

6. Efforts at consolation, in popular rather than in strictly philosophic or scientific vein (1024-1094).

(a) Why should we shrink from death? Better men, by far, than we have died; even Epicurus died (1024-1052).

(b) Learn rightly the constitution and laws of the world and all that therein is: your present discontent and your fear of death will vanish (1053-1075).

(c) Why complain that death is near? Why desire length of days? The future may be fraught only with grievous sorrows (1076-1086), and the longest measure of human existence will not shorten one jot eternal death (1087-1094). C. K.

### THE VESTALS

The collection of material in Mr. White's paper, The Vestal Virgins of Ancient Rome, THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 12.153-155, is so full, and so excellently adapted to the needs both of the future historian of the Vestals and of the rest of us who are interested in this remarkable cult and its priesthood, that I feel encouraged to add a few references to discussions which I have come across and have found helpful.

There is scholarly discussion scattered through W. Warde Fowler's Religious Experience of the Roman People (London, 1911), and Roman Ideas of Deity in the Last Century Before the Christian Era (London, 1914); see the indices to the two books. The rule of chastity is treated by J. B. Carter, in the article Chastity (Roman), in Hastings's Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.

The portrait statues of the Vestals are discussed from the standpoint of the history of artistic types of draped statues, by A. Hekler, in the volume published in honor